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Abstract
Cirquent calculus is a proof system manipulating circuit-style constructs rather than formulas. Using
it, this article constructs a sound and complete axiomatization CL16 of the propositional fragment of
computability logic (the game-semantically conceived logic of computational problems) whose logical vo-
cabulary consists of negation and parallel and choice connectives, and whose atoms represent elementary,
i.e. moveless, games.
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1 Introduction
Computability logic, or CoL for short, is a long-term project for developing a logic capable of acting as a
comprehensive formal theory of computability in the same sense as classical logic is a formal theory of truth
(see [21] for a survey). The approach starts by asking what kinds of mathematical objects “computational
problems” are in their full generality, and finds that they can be most adequately understood as games played
by a machine against its environment, with computability meaning existence of an (algorithmic) winning
strategy for the machine. As its next step, CoL tries to identify a collection of the most natural, meaningful
and potentially useful operations on games. These operations then form the connectives, quantifiers and
other constructs of the logical vocabulary of CoL. Validity of a formula is understood as being “always
computable”, i.e. computable in virtue of the meanings of its logical operators regardless of how the non-
logical atoms are interpreted. The final and most challenging step in developing CoL is finding sound
and complete axiomatizations for ever more expressive fragments of this semantically construed logic. The
present contribution adds one more brick to this edifice under construction.
Among the main connectives of the language of CoL are negation (“not”) ¬, parallel conjunction (“pand”)
∧, parallel disjunction (“por”) ∨, choice conjunction (“chand”) ⊓, and choice disjunction (“chor”) ⊔. Where
G,H are games, the game-semantical meanings of the above connectives can be briefly characterized as
follows. The game ¬G is nothing but G with the roles of the two players interchanged. G ∧ H is a game
playing which means playing G and H in parallel, where the machine wins if it wins in both components.
G∨H differs from G∧H only in that here winning in just one of the components is sufficient. G⊓H is the
game where, at the beginning, the environment chooses one of the two components, after which the game
continues according to the rules of the chosen component. G ⊔ H is similar, only here it is the machine
who makes an initial left-or-right choice. Game operations with similar intuitive characterizations have been
studied by Lorenzen [29], Hintikka [9] and Blass [4, 5] in their dialogue/game semantics, with Blass [5] being
the first to systematically differentiate between the parallel and choice sorts of operations and pointing out
their resemblance with the multiplicative (∧,∨) and additive (⊓,⊔) connectives of Girard’s [8] linear logic.
Many other operators of CoL have no known analogs in the literature. CoL also has two sorts of atoms:
general atoms stranding for any games, and elementary atoms standing for propositions. The latter are
understood as games with no moves, automatically won by the machine when true and lost when false. The
fragments of CoL with only general atoms [3, 13, 17, 20, 24, 26, 27, 30, 31, 33, 34] are called general-base, the
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fragments with only elementary atoms [11, 14, 25, 28] are called elementary-base, and the fragments where
both sorts of atoms are present [12, 15, 19, 22, 32] are called mixed-base.
All attempts to axiomatize the (whatever-base) full {¬,∧,∨,⊓,⊔}-fragment of CoL within the framework
of traditional proof calculi had failed, and it was conjectured [5, 13] that such an axiomatization was impos-
sible to achieve in principle even for the {¬,∧,∨}-subfragment. The recent work [7] by Das and Strassburger
has positively verified this conjecture. As a way to break the ice, [13] introduced the new sort of a proof
calculus called cirquent calculus, in which a sound and complete axiomatization of the general-base {¬,∧,∨}-
fragment of CoL was constructed; this result was later lifted to the mixed-base level in [32]. Rather than
being limited to tree-like objects such as formulas, sequents, hypersequents [1] or deep-inference structures
[6], cirquent calculus deals with circuit-style constructs dubbed cirquents. Cirquents come in a variety of
forms and sometimes, as in the present work or in [35, 36], they are written textually rather than graphically,
but their essence and main distinguishing feature remains the same: these are syntactic constructs explicitly
allowing sharing of components between different subcomponents. Ordinary formulas of CoL are nothing
but special cases of cirquents — they are degenerate cirquents where nothing is shared.
Sharing, itself, also takes different forms, such as two ∨-gates sharing a child, or two ⊔-gates sharing
the left-or-right choice associated with them without otherwise sharing descendants. Most cirquent calculus
systems studied so far [3, 13, 18, 26, 27, 32] only incorporate the first sort of sharing. The idea of the
second sort of sharing, dubbed clustering, was introduced and motivated in [23]. Among the potential
benefits of it outlined in [23] was offering new perspectives on independence-free logic [10]. Later work by
Wenyan Xu [35, 36] made a significant progress towards materializing such a potential. The present work
materializes another benefit offered by clustering: it constructs a sound and complete cirquent calculus
axiomatization CL16 of the full elementary-base {¬,∧,∨,⊓,⊔}-fragment of CoL. No axiomatizations of
any ⊓,⊔-containing fragments of CoL had been known so far (other than the brute-force constructions
of [11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 22], with their deduction mechanisms more resembling games than logical calculi).
Generalizing from formulas to cirquents with clustering thus offers not only greater expressiveness, but also
makes the otherwise unaxiomatizable CoL or certain fragments of it amenable to being tamed as logical
calculi.
2 Games and strategies
As noted, CoL understands computational problems as games played between two players, called the machine
and the environment. The symbolic names for these players are ⊤ and ⊥, respectively. ⊤ is a deterministic
mechanical device only capable of following algorithmic strategies, whereas there are no restrictions on the
behavior of ⊥. Our sympathies are with ⊤, and by just saying “won” or “lost” without specifying a player,
we always mean won or lost by ⊤. ℘ is always a variable ranging over {⊤,⊥}. ¬℘ means ℘’s adversary, i.e.
the player that is not ℘.
Amove is a finite string over the standard keyboard alphabet. A labeled move is a move prefixed with
⊤ or ⊥, with such a prefix (label) indicating which player has made the move. A run is a (finite or infinite)
sequence of labeled moves, and a position is a finite run. Runs will be often delimited by “〈” and “〉”, with
〈〉 thus denoting the empty run.
Definition 2.1 A game1 is a pair A = (LrA,WnA), where:
1. LrA is a set of runs satisfying the condition that a finite or infinite run is in LrA iff all of its nonempty
finite — not necessarily proper — initial segments are in LrA (notice that this implies 〈〉 ∈ LrA). The
elements of LrA are said to be legal runs of A, and all other runs are said to be illegal. We say that α is
a legal move for a player ℘ in a position Φ of A iff 〈Φ, ℘α〉 ∈ LrA; otherwise α is an illegal move. When
the last move of the shortest illegal initial segment of Γ is ℘-labeled, we say that Γ is a ℘-illegal run of A;
℘-legal means “‘not ℘-illegal”.
2. WnA is a function that sends every run Γ to one of the players ⊤ or ⊥, satisfying the condition that
if Γ is a ℘-illegal run of A, then WnA〈Γ〉 = ¬℘.2 When WnA〈Γ〉 = ℘, we say that Γ is a ℘-won (or won
1In CoL, the proper name of the concept defined here is “constant game”, with the word “game” reserved for a more general
concept; however, since constant games are the only kinds of games we care about in the present paper, we omit the word
“constant” and just say “game”.
2We write WnA〈Γ〉 for WnA(Γ).
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by ℘) run of A; otherwise Γ is lost by ℘. Thus, an illegal run is always lost by the player who has made
the first illegal move in it.
It is clear from the above definition that, when defining a particular game A, it would be sufficient
to specify what positions (finite runs) are legal, and what legal runs are won. Such a definition will then
uniquely extend to all — including infinite and illegal — runs. We will implicitly rely on this observation in
the sequel.
A game is said to be elementary iff it has no legal runs other than the (always legal) empty run 〈〉.
That is, an elementary game is a “game” without any (legal) moves, automatically won or lost. There are
exactly two such games, for which we use the same symbols ⊤ and ⊥ as for the two players: the game ⊤
automatically won by player ⊤, and the game ⊥ automatically won by player ⊥.3 Computability logic is
a conservative extension of classical logic, understanding classical propositions as elementary games. And,
just like classical logic, it sees no difference between any two true propositions such as “0 = 0” and “Snow
is white”, and identifies them with the elementary game ⊤; similarly, it treats false propositions such as
“0 = 1” or “Snow is black” as the elementary game ⊥.
An HPM (“Hard-Play Machine”) is a Turing machine with the additional capability of making moves.
The adversary can also move at any time, with such moves being the only nondeterministic events from the
machine’s perspective. Along with the ordinary read/write work tape,4 the machine also has an additional
tape called the run tape. The latter, at any time, spells the “current position” of the play. The role of
this tape is to make the interaction history fully visible to the machine. It is read-only, and its content is
automatically updated every time either player makes a move.
In these terms, a solution (⊤’s winning strategy) for a given game A is understood as an HPM M such
that, no matter how the environment acts during its interaction with M (what moves it makes and when),
the run incrementally spelled on the run tape is a ⊤-won run of A. When this is the case, we write M |= A
and say that M wins, or solves, A, and that A is a computable game.
There is no need to define ⊥’s strategies, because all possible behaviors by ⊥ are accounted for by the
different possible nondeterministic updates of the run tape of an HPM.
In the above outline, we described HPMs in a relaxed fashion, without being specific about technical
details such as, say, how, exactly, moves are made by the machine, how many moves either player can make
at once, what happens if both players attempt to move “simultaneously”, etc. As it turns out, all reasonable
design choices yield the same class of winnable games as long as we consider a certain natural subclass
of games called static. Intuitively, these are games where the relative speeds of the players are irrelevant
because, as Blass has once put it, “it never hurts a player to postpone making moves”. Below comes a formal
definition of this concept.
For either player ℘, we say that a run Υ is a ℘-delay of a run Γ iff:
• for both players ℘′ ∈ {⊤,⊥}, the subsequence of ℘′-labeled moves of Υ is the same as that of Γ, and
• for any n, k ≥ 1, if the nth ℘-labeled move is made later than (is to the right of) the kth ¬℘-labeled
move in Γ, then so is it in Υ.
The above conditions mean that in Υ each player has made the same sequence of moves as in Γ, only, in Υ,
℘ might have been acting with some delay.
Now, we say that a game A is static iff, whenever a run Υ is a ℘-delay of a run Γ, we have:
• if Γ is a ℘-legal run of A, then so is Υ;
• if Γ is a ℘-won run of A, then so is Υ.
All games that we shall see in this paper are static. In fact, they are not merely static, but belong to a
special subclass of static games called “enumeration games”, where even the order in which the players make
their moves is irrelevant, and thus runs can be seen as multisets rather than sequences of labeled moves.
Precisely, an enumeration game is a game A such that, for any run Γ and any permutation ∆ of Γ, Γ is
a legal (resp. won) run of A iff so is ∆.
Dealing only with static games, which makes timing technicalities fully irrelevant, allows us to describe
and analyze strategies (HPMs) in a relaxed fashion. For instance, imagine HPM N works by simulating and
3Precisely, we have Wn⊤〈〉 = ⊤ and Wn⊥〈〉 = ⊥.
4In computational-complexity-sensitive treatments, an HPM is allowed to have any (fixed) number of work tapes.
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mimicking the work and actions of another HPM M in the scenario where M’s imaginary adversary acts in
the same way as N ’s own adversary. Due to the simulation overhead, N will generally be much slower than
M in responding to its adversary’s moves. Yet, we may safely assume/pretend that the speeds of the two
machines do not differ and thus they will be generating identical runs. This is “even more so” when we deal
with enumeration games. In what follows we will often implicitly rely on this observation.
3 Syntax
We fix an infinite list of syntactic objects called elementary game letters, for which we will be using
p, q, r as metavariables. A positive (resp. negative) literal is the expression p (resp. ¬p), where p is an
elementary game letter. Here p is said to be the type of the literal.
We further fix two pairwise disjoint infinite sets C(⊔) and C(⊓) of decimal numerals. The elements of
C(⊔) ∪C(⊓) are said to be clusters. A cluster c is said to be disjunctive if c ∈ C(⊔), and conjunctive if
c ∈ C(⊓).
The symbol ∨ (resp. ∧) is said to be parallel disjunction (resp. parallel conjunction). A choice
disjunction (resp. choice conjunction) is a pair ⊔c (resp. ⊓c), where c is a disjunctive (resp. conjunc-
tive) cluster. A common name for disjunctions and conjunctions of either sort is “connective”, and the
corresponding symbol ∨,∧,⊔ or ⊓ is said to be the type of the connective. Given a choice connective ⊔c or
⊓c, c is said to be its cluster; in this case we may as well say that the connective belongs to — or is in
— cluster c.
Definition 3.1 A cirquent is defined inductively as follows:
• ⊤ and ⊥ are cirquents.
• Each literal is a cirquent.
• If A and B are cirquents, then (A) ∨ (B) is a cirquent.
• If A and B are cirquents, then (A) ∧ (B) is a cirquent.
• If A and B are cirquents and c is a conjunctive cluster, then (A) ⊓c (B) is a cirquent.
• If A and B are cirquents and c is a disjunctive cluster, then (A) ⊔c (B) is a cirquent.
By a cluster of a cirquent C we shall mean the cluster c of some choice connective occurring in C. In
such a case we may as well say that cluster c occurs in C.
When writing cirquents, parentheses will usually be omitted if this causes no ambiguity. When doing
so, it is our convention that choice connectives take precedence over parallel connectives. So, for instance,
A ⊓c B ∨ C means (A ⊓c B) ∨ C rather than A ⊓c (B ∨C).
Sometimes we may write an expression such as A1 ∨ . . .∨An, where n is a (possibly unspecified) natural
number with n ≥ 2. This is to be understood as any (unspecified) order-respecting ∨-combination of the
cirquents A1, . . . , An. “Order-respecting” in the sense that A1 is the leftmost item of the combination, then
comes A2, then A3, etc. Similarly for A1 ∧ . . . ∧An. So, for instance, both (A ∧B) ∧C and A ∧ (B ∧C) —
and no other cirquent — can be written as A ∧B ∧C.
Officially, as we see, ¬ (negation) is only allowed to be applied to elementary game letters. Shall we write
¬E where E is not an elementary game letter, it is to be understood as an abbreviation defined by: ¬¬A = A;
¬(A ∧ B) = ¬A ∨ ¬B; ¬(A ∨ B) = ¬A ∧ ¬B; ¬(A ⊓c B) = ¬A ⊔c ¬B; ¬(A ⊔c B) = ¬A ⊓c ¬B. Similarly,
A→ B is an abbreviation of (¬A) ∨ B. When writing cirquents, parentheses will usually be omitted if this
causes no ambiguity. When doing so, it is our convention that ¬ has the highest precedence, then comes →,
then come the choice connectives, and finally the parallel connectives. So, for instance, ¬A∨B → C∧D⊓cE
means ((¬(A)) ∨ (B))→ ((C) ∧ ((D) ⊓c (E))), i.e., ((A) ∧ (¬(B))) ∨ ((C) ∧ ((D) ⊓c (E))).
We define the root of a cirquent C to be C itself if C is ⊤, ⊥ or a literal, and ∨ (resp. ∧, resp. ⊔c, resp.
⊓c) if C is of the form A ∨ B (resp. A ∧ B, resp. A ⊔c B, resp. A ⊓c B). When r is the root of C, we say
that C is r-rooted.
4
4 Semantics
We define LegRuns as the set of all runs satisfying the following conditions:
1. Every move of Γ is the string c.0 or c.1, where c is a cluster.
2. Whenever Γ contains a move c.i where c is a disjunctive cluster, the move is ⊤-labeled.
3. Whenever Γ contains a move c.i where c is a conjunctive cluster, the move is ⊥-labeled.
4. For any cluster c, Γ contains at most one move of the form c.i.
The intuitive meaning of condition 1 is that every move signifies a choice “left” (0) or “right” (1) in some
cluster; conditions 2 and 3 say that ⊤ moves (chooses) only in disjunctive clusters and ⊥ only in conjunctive
clusters; and condition 4 says that, in any given cluster, a choice can be made only once.
Given a run Γ ∈ LegRuns, we say that a cirquent of the form A ⊔c B or A ⊓c B is Γ-resolved iff Γ
contains (exactly) one of the moves c.0 or c.1; then by the Γ-resolvent of the cirquent we mean A if such
a move is c.0, and B if it is c.1. “Γ-unresolved” means “not Γ-resolved”. When Γ is clear from the context,
we may omit a reference to it and simply say “resolved”, “unresolved” or “resolvent”.
An interpretation is a function ∗ which assigns to each elementary game letter p an element p∗ of
{⊤,⊥}. Intuitively, such a function tells us whether p, as a proposition, is true or false.
Definition 4.1 Each cirquent C and interpretation ∗ induces a unique game C∗, which we may refer to as
“C under the interpretation ∗”. The set LrC
∗
of legal runs of such a game is nothing a but LegRuns. Since
LrC
∗
does not depend on C or ∗, subsequently we shall simply say “legal run” rather than “legal run of
C∗”. The WnC
∗
component of the game C∗ is defined by stipulating that a legal run Γ is a won (by the
machine) run of C iff one of the following conditions is satisfied:
1. C is ⊤.
2. C is a positive (resp. negative) literal and, where p is the type of that literal, p∗ = ⊤ (resp. p∗ = ⊥).
3. C is A0 ∨ A1 (resp. A0 ∧ A1) and, for at least one (resp. both) i ∈ {0, 1}, Γ is a won run of Ai.
4. C is A0 ⊔c A1, it is resolved and, where Ai is the resolvent, Γ is a won run of Ai.
5. C is A0 ⊓c A1 and either it is unresolved, or else, where Ai is the resolvent, Γ is a won run of Ai.
Definition 4.2 Consider a cirquent C.
1. For an interpretation ∗, a solution of C under ∗, or simply a solution of C∗, is an HPM H such that
H |= C∗. We say that C is computable under ∗, or simply that C∗ is computable, iff C∗ has a solution.
2. A logical (or uniform) solution of C is an HPM H such that, for any interpretation ∗, H is a solution
of C∗. We say that C is valid iff it has a logical solution.5
Remark 4.3 The cirquents in the present sense can be understood as generalizations of the formulas of
system CL1 of CoL constructed in [11]. Syntactically, the formulas differ from cirquents only in that no
clusters are attached to ⊔,⊓. Each formula F can be seen as a cirquent C where no two different occurrences
of a choice connective belong to the same cluster, i.e., as a cirquent with no sharing of choices associated
with ⊔,⊓. More specifically, C is a cirquent obtained from F via superscripting each occurrence of ⊔ by a
unique disjunctive cluster and each occurrence of ⊓ by a unique conjunctive cluster. Let us call such a C a
cirquentization of F . We claim without a proof that, given a formula F and a cirquentization C of it, the two
are semantically equivalent. Namely, any HPM F can be transformed into an HPM C — and vice versa —
so that, for any interpretation ∗, we have F |= F ∗ iff C |= C∗ (with F ∗ understood as in [11]). Consequently,
F is valid iff C is so.
5 Axiomatics
By a rule of inference we mean a set R of pairs ~A  B, called applications of R, where ~A is a tuple
consisting of one or two cirquents, called the premise(s), and B is a cirquent, called the conclusion. When
~A B is in R, we say that B follows from ~A by rule R.
5In CoL, this sort of validity is called logical (or uniform) validity. There is also another natural sort of validity, called
nonlogical (or multiform) validity. Namely, a cirquent (or formula) C is multiformly valid iff, for any interpretation ∗, C∗
is computable. Nonlogical validity will not be considered in this paper.
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In this section and later we will be using the notation X [E1, . . . , En] to stand for a cirquent (intuitively
“of structure X”) together with some fixed subcirquents E1, . . . , En. Then, if we later write X [F1, . . . , Fn]
in the same context, it should be understood as the result of replacing, in X [E1, . . . , En], all occurrences
of E1, . . . , En by F1, . . . , Fn, respectively. When this notation is used in the formulation of a rule of in-
ference, our convention is that the context is always set by the conclusion. So, for instance, if we have
a (sub)expression X [E] in the conclusion and X [F ] in a premise, then X [F ] is the result of replacing all
occurrences of E by F in X [E] rather than vice versa.
Below is a full list of the rules of inference of our system CL16. The first seven rules come in two
versions, between which we shall later differentiate by suffixing the name of the rule with “(a)” for the first
version and “(b)” for the second version. The last rule takes two premises, while all other rules take a single
premise. The rules are written schematically, with A,B,C,D (possibly with indices) acting as variables for
subcirquents, a, b, c as variables for clusters, and X,Y as variables for “structures”. The names of these rules
have been chosen according to the conclusion-to-premises (rather than premises-to-conclusion) intuitions.
Commutativity: X [B ∨ A] X [A ∨B] and X [B ∧ A] X [A ∧B].
Associativity: X [A ∨ (B ∨ C)] X [(A ∨B) ∨ C)] and X [A ∧ (B ∧C)] X [(A ∧B) ∧ C)].
Identity: X [A] X [A ∨ ⊥] and X [A] X [A ∧ ⊤].
Domination: X [⊤] X [A ∨ ⊤] and X [⊥] X [A ∧ ⊥].
Choosing: X [A1, . . . , An] X [A1 ⊔cB1, . . . , An ⊔cBn] and X [B1, . . . , Bn] X [A1 ⊔cB1, . . . , An ⊔cBn],
where A1 ⊔
c B1, . . . , An ⊔
c Bn are all ⊔
c-rooted subcirquents of the conclusion.
Cleansing: X
[
Y [A] ⊓c C
]
 X
[
Y [A ⊓c B] ⊓c C
]
and X
[
C ⊓c Y [B]
]
 X
[
C ⊓c Y [A ⊓c B]
]
.
Distribution: X [(A ∨ C) ∧ (B ∨ C)] X [(A ∧B) ∨ C] and X [(A ∨ C) ⊓c (B ∨C)] X [(A ⊓c B) ∨ C].
Trivialization: X [⊤] X [¬p ∨ p], where p is an elementary letter.
Quadrilemma: X
[(
A ∧ (C ⊓b D)
)
⊓a
(
B ∧ (C ⊓b D)
))
⊓c
((
((A ⊓a B) ∧ C
)
⊓b
(
(A ⊓a B) ∧ D
))]
 
X [(A ⊓a B) ∧ (C ⊓b D)], where c does not occur in the conclusion.
Splitting: A,B  A ⊓c B, where neither A nor B has an occurrence of c.
A proof of a cirquent A is a sequence C1, . . . , Cn (n ≥ 1) of cirquents such that C1 = ⊤, Cn = A and, for
each i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, Ci follows by one of the rules of inference from some earlier cirquents in the sequence.
Thus, ⊤ is the only axiom of CL16.
Example 5.1 Below is a proof of p∧q⊔c r → (p∧q)⊔d (p∧r), i.e. of (¬p∨¬q⊓c¬r)∨ (p∧q)⊔d (p∧r). For
brevity, consecutive applications of Commutativity or Associativity have been combined together in single
steps.
1. ⊤ Axiom
2. ⊤ ∧ ⊤ Identity(b): 1
3. (¬q ∨ ⊤) ∧ (¬p ∨ ⊤) Domination(a): 2 (twice)
4.
(
¬q ∨ (¬p ∨ p)
)
∧
(
¬p ∨ (¬q ∨ q)
)
Trivialization: 3 (twice)
5.
(
(¬q ∨ ¬p) ∨ p
)
∧
(
(¬p ∨ ¬q) ∨ q
)
Associativity(a): 4 (twice)
6.
(
p ∨ (¬q ∨ ¬p)
)
∧
(
q ∨ (¬q ∨ ¬p)
)
Commutativity(a): 5 (three times)
7. (p ∧ q) ∨ (¬q ∨ ¬p) Distribution(a): 6
8. (¬q ∨ ¬p) ∨ (p ∧ q) Commutativity: 7
9. (¬q ∨ ¬p) ∨ (p ∧ q) ⊔d (p ∧ r) Choosing(a): 8
10. (¬r ∨ ⊤) ∧ (¬p ∨ ⊤) Domination(a): 2 (twice)
11.
(
¬r ∨ (¬p ∨ p)
)
∧
(
¬p ∨ (¬r ∨ r)
)
Trivialization: 10 (twice)
12.
(
(¬r ∨ ¬p) ∨ p
)
∧ (
(
¬p ∨ ¬r) ∨ r
)
Associativity(a): 11 (twice)
13.
(
p ∨ (¬r ∨ ¬p)
)
∧
(
r ∨ (¬p ∨ ¬r)
)
Commutativity(a): 12 (twice)
14. (p ∧ r) ∨ (¬r ∨ ¬p) Distribution(a): 13
15. (¬r ∨ ¬p) ∨ (p ∧ r) Commutativity(a): 14
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16. (¬r ∨ ¬p) ∨ (p ∧ q) ⊔d (p ∧ r) Choosing(b): 15
17.
(
(¬q ∨ ¬p) ∨ (p ∧ q) ⊔d (p ∧ r)
)
⊓c
(
(¬r ∨ ¬p) ∨ (p ∧ q) ⊔d (p ∧ r)
)
Splitting: 9,16
18. (¬q ∨ ¬p) ⊓c (¬r ∨ ¬p) ∨ (p ∧ q) ⊔d (p ∧ r) Distribution(b): 17
19. (¬q ⊓c ¬r ∨ ¬p) ∨ (p ∧ q) ⊔d (p ∧ r) Distribution(b): 18
20. (¬p ∨ ¬q ⊓c ¬r) ∨ (p ∧ q) ⊔d (p ∧ r) Commutativity(a): 19
6 The preservation lemma
Lemma 6.1 Consider an arbitrary interpretation ∗.
1. Each application of any of the rules of CL16 preserves computability under ∗ in the premises-to-
conclusion direction, i.e., if all premises are computable under ∗, then so is the conclusion.
2. Each application of any of the rules of CL16 other than Choosing also preserves computability under ∗
in the conclusion-to-premises direction, i.e., if the conclusion is computable under ∗, then so are all premises.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary interpretation ∗. Since ∗ is going to be fixed throughout this proof, for
readability we agree to omit explicit references to it. So, for instance, where E is a cirquent, we may write
E instead of E∗, or say “. . . solution of E” instead of “. . . solution of E under ∗”. Throughout this and some
later proofs, when trying to show that a given machine H is a solution of a given game G, we implicitly
rely on what is called the “clean environment assumption”. According to it, H’s environment never makes
moves that are not legal moves of G. Assuming that this condition is satisfied is legitimate, because, if H’s
environment makes an illegal move, H automatically wins.
If E  F is an application of any of the rules other than Splitting or Choosing, it is not hard to see that E
and F are identical as games. So, a solution of E is automatically a solution of F , and vice versa. Let us just
look at Cleansing(a) as an illustrative example. Consider an application X
[
Y [A]⊓cC
]
 X
[
Y [A⊓cB]⊓cC
]
of this rule. Let Γ be an arbitrary legal run. We want to show that Γ is a won run of E iff it is a won run
of F . If c is unresolved in Γ, then the Y [A ⊓c B] ⊓c C component of the conclusion will be won just like the
Y [A]⊓cC component of the premise. Since the two cirquents only differ in that one has Y [A⊓cB]⊓cC where
the other has Y [A] ⊓c C, we find that Γ is a won run of both games or neither. Now assume c is resolved,
i.e., Γ contains the move c.i (i = 0 or i = 1). If i = 1, then Γ is a won run of X [Y [A ⊓c B] ⊓c C] iff it is a
won run of X [C] iff it is a won run of X [Y [A]⊓c C]. And if i = 0, then Γ is a won run of X
[
Y [A⊓c B]⊓c C
]
iff it is a won run of X
[
Y [A ⊓c B]
]
iff it is a won run of X
[
Y [A]
]
iff it is a won run of X
[
Y [A ⊓c C]
]
. Thus,
in either case, the conclusion is won iff so is the premise.
Consider an application A,B  A ⊓c B of Splitting.
For the premises-to-conclusion direction, assume the premises are computable, namely, HPMs MA and
MB are solutions of A and B, respectively. Let N be an HPM which, at the beginning of the play, waits
till the environment makes one of the moves c.0 or c.1. After that, where α1, . . . , αn are the moves made
by the environment before the move c.0 (resp. c.1) was made, N starts simulating MA (resp. MB), with
⊥α1, . . . ,⊥αn on the imaginary run tape of the latter at the very first clock cycle. Whenever N sees that
the simulated machine MA (resp. MB) made a move, N makes the same move; N also periodically checks
its own run tape to see if the environment has made any new moves in the real play and, if yes, it appends
those (⊥-prefixed) moves to the imaginary run tape of the simulated machine. In more relaxed and intuitive
terms, what we just said about the actions of N after the environment has moved c.0 (resp. c.1) can be put
as “N plays exactly likeMA (resp. MB) would play in the scenario where, at the very start of the play, the
environment made the moves α1, . . . , αn”. Later, in similar situations, we shall usually describe and analyze
HPMs in relaxed terms, without going into technical details of simulation and without even using the word
“simulation”. Since we exclusively deal with static games, this relaxed approach is safe and valid (see the
end of Section 2). Anyway, it is not hard to see that our N is a solution of A ⊓c B.
For the conclusion-to-premises direction, assume N is a solution of A ⊓c B. Let MA (resp. MB) be an
HPM which plays just like N would in the scenario where, at the very start of the play, N ’s adversary made
the move c.0 (resp. c.1). Obviously MA and MB are solutions of A and B, respectively.
Consider an application X [A1, . . . , An]  X [A1 ⊔c B1, . . . , An ⊔c Bn] of Choosing(a), and assume M is
a solution of the premise. Let N be an HPM which, at the beginning of the game, makes the move c.0,
after which it plays exactly as M would. Obviously M is a solution of the conclusion. Choosing(b) will be
handled in a similar way. 
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The following is an immediate corollary of Lemma 6.1:
Corollary 6.2 1. Each application of any of the rules of CL16 preserves validity in the premise-to-
conclusion direction, i.e., if all premises are valid, then so is the conclusion.
2. Each application of any of the rules of CL16 other than Choosing also preserves validity in the
conclusion-to-premise direction, i.e., if the conclusion is valid, then so are all premises.
Remark 6.3 Lemma 6.1 and Corollary 6.2 state the existence of certain solutions. A look back at our proof
of those statements reveals that, in fact, this existence is constructive. Namely, in the case of clause (a)
of Lemma 6.1, for any given rule, there is a ∗-independent effective procedure which extracts an HPM M
from the premise(s), the conclusion and HPMs that purportedly solve the premises under ∗; as long as these
purported solutions are indeed solutions,M is a solution of the conclusion under ∗. Similarly for clause (b).
In the case of clause (a) of Corollary 6.2, for any given rule, there is an effective procedure which extracts
an HPM M from the premise(s), the conclusion and purported logical solutions of the premises; as long
as these purported logical solutions are indeed logical solutions, M is a logical solution of the conclusion.
Similarly for clause (b).
7 Soundness and completeness
Below we use the standard notation na (“tower of a’s of height n”) for tertration, defined inductively by
1a = a and n+1a = a(
na). So, for instance, 35 = 55
5
.
Definition 7.1 The rank C of a cirquent C is the number defined as follows:
1. If C is ⊤, ⊥ or a literal, then C = 1.
2. If C is A ⊔c B or A ⊓c B, then C = A+B.
3. If C is A ∧B, then C = 5A+B.
4. If C is A ∨B, then C = A+B5.
Lemma 7.2 The rank function is monotone in the following sense. Consider a cirquent A with a sub-
cirquent B. Assume B′ is a cirquent with B′ < B, and A′ is the result of replacing an occurrence of B by
B′ in A. Then A′ < A.
Proof. This is so due to the monotonicity of the functions x+ y, 5x and x5. 
A surface occurrence of a subcirquent or a connective in a given cirquent is an occurrence which is
not in the scope of a choice connective.
Definition 7.3 We say that a cirquent D is pure iff the following conditions are satisfied:
1. D has no surface occurrences of ⊥ unless D itself is ⊥.
2. D has no surface occurrence of ∧ which is in the scope of ∨.
3. D has no surface occurrence of ⊓c (whatever cluster c) which is in the scope of ∨.
4. D has no surface occurrence of the form A1 ∨ . . .∨An such that, for some elementary letter p, both p
and ¬p are among A1, . . . , An.
5. D has no surface occurrences of ⊤ unless D itself is ⊤.
6. If D is of the form A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An (n ≥ 2), then at least one Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is not of the form B ⊓
c C.
7. If D is of the form A ⊓c B, then neither A nor B contains the cluster c.
Below we describe a procedure which takes a cirquent D and applies to it a series of modifications. Each
modification changes the value of D so that the old value of D follows from the new value by one of the
single-premise rules (other than Choosing) of CL16. The procedure is divided into 7 stages, and the purpose
of each stage i ∈ {1, . . . , 7} is to make D satisfy the corresponding condition i of Definition 7.3.
Procedure Purification applied to a cirquent D: Starting from Stage 1, each of the following 7 stages
is a loop that should be iterated until it no longer modifies (the current value of) D; then the procedure goes
to the next stage, unless the current stage was Stage 7, in which case the procedure returns (the then-current
value of) D and terminates.
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Stage 1: If D has a surface occurrence of the form ⊥∨A or A∨⊥, change the latter to A using Identity(a)
perhaps in combination with Commutativity(a). Next, if D has a surface occurrence of the form ⊥ ∧ A or
A ∧ ⊥, change it to ⊥ using Domination(b) perhaps in combination with Commutativity(b).
Stage 2: If D has a surface occurrence of the form (A∧B)∨C or C∨(A∧B), change it to (A∨C)∧(B∨C)
using Distributivity(a) perhaps in combination with Commutativity(a).
Stage 3: IfD has a surface occurrence of the form (A⊓cB)∨C or C∨(A⊓cB), change it to (A∨C)⊓c(B∨C)
using Distributivity(b) perhaps in combination with Commutativity(a).
Stage 4: If D has a surface occurrence of the form A1 ∨ . . .∨An and, for some elementary letter p, both p
and ¬p are among A1, . . . , An, change A1 ∨ . . . ∨An to ⊤ using Trivialization, perhaps in combination with
Domination(a), Commutativity(a) and Associativity(a).
Stage 5: If D has a surface occurrence of the form ⊤ ∨ A or A ∨ ⊤, change it to ⊤ using Domination(a)
perhaps in combination with Commutativity(a). Next, if D has a surface occurrence of the form ⊤ ∧ A or
A ∧ ⊤, change it to A using Identity(b) perhaps in combination with Commutativity(b).
Stage 6: If D has a surface occurrence of the form (A ⊓a B) ∧ (E ⊓b F ), change it to
((
A ∧ (E ⊓b F )
)
⊓a
(
B ∧ (E ⊓b F )
))
⊓c
((
(A ⊓a B) ∧ E
)
⊓b
(
(A ⊓a B) ∧D
))
using Quadrilemma.
Stage 7: If D is of the form X [E ⊓c F ] ⊓c A (resp. A ⊓c X [E ⊓c F ]), change it to X [E] ⊓c A (resp.
A ⊓c X [F ]) using Cleansing.
Lemma 7.4 Each stage of the Purification procedure strictly reduces the rank of D.
Proof. Each stage replaces an occurrence of a subcirquent A of D by some cirquent B. In view of
Lemma 7.2, in order to show that such a replacement reduces the rank D of D, it is sufficient to show that
B < A. Keep in mind that the rank of a cirquent is always at least 1.
Stage 1: Each iteration of this stage replaces in D an occurrence of ⊥ ∨A, A ∨ ⊥, ⊥∧ A or A ∧ ⊥ by A
or ⊥. Of course, both A and ⊥ are smaller than ⊥ ∨ A, A ∨ ⊥, ⊥ ∧A and A ∧ ⊥.
Stage 2: Each iteration of this stage replaces in D an occurrence of (A ∧ B) ∨ C or C ∨ (A ∧ B) by
(A ∨ C) ∧ (B ∨ C). (A ∧B) ∨ C (or C ∨ (A ∧B)) is [5
(A+B)+C]5 and (A ∨ C) ∧ (B ∨C) is 5[
(A+C)5+(B+C)5].
We want to show that 5[
(A+C)5+(B+C)5] < [5
A+B+C]5. We of course have A + B + 1 < 5A+B, whence
A+B + C + 1 < 5A+B + C, whence [A+B+C+1]5 <[5
A+B+C] 5. We also have
5[
(A+C)5+(B+C)5] = 5[
(A+C)5] × 5[
(B+C)5] =(A+C+1) 5×(B+C+1) 5 ≤[A+B+C+1] 5.
Consequently, 5[
(A+C)5+(B+C)5] <[5
A+B+C] 5, as desired.
Stage 3: (A ⊓c B) ∨ C (or C ∨ (A ⊓c B) is (A+B+C)5, and (A ∨ C) ⊓c (B ∨C) is (A+C)5+(B+C)5. Taking
into account that ranks are always positive, we obviously have (A+C)5 +(B+C) 5 <(A+B+C) 5.
Stage 4: ⊤ = 1 < A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An.
Stage 5: Similar to Stage 1.
Stage 6: (A ⊓a B) ∧ (E ⊓b F ) is 5[A+B+E+F ], and
((
A ∧ (E ⊓b F )
)
⊓a
(
B ∧ (E ⊓b F )
))
⊓c
((
(A ⊓a B) ∧ E
)
⊓b
(
(A ⊓a B) ∧D
))
is 5(A+E+F ) + 5(B+E+F ) + 5(A+B+E) + 5(A+B+F ). Obviously the latter is smaller than the former.
Stage 7: Each iteration of this stage replaces a subcirquent E ⊓c F by E (resp. F ). The rank E + F of
E ⊓c F is greater than the rank E of E (resp. the rank F of F ). 
Where A is the initial value of D in the Purification procedure and B is its final value (which exists by
Lemma 7.4), we call B the purification of A.
Lemma 7.5 For any cirquent A and its purification B, we have:
1. If B is provable, then so is A.
2. A is valid iff so is B.
3. B is pure.
4. The rank of B does not exceed the rank of A.
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Proof. Clause 1: When obtaining B from A, each transformation performed during the Purification
procedure applies, in the conclusion-to-premise sense, one of the inference rules of CL16. Reversing the
order of those transformations, we get a derivation of A from B. Appending that derivation to a proof of B
(if one exists) yields a proof of A.
Clause 2: Immediate from the two clauses of Lemma 6.2 and the fact that, when obtaining B from A
using the Purification procedure, the rule of Choosing is never used.
Clause 3: One by one, Stage 1 eliminates all surface occurrences of ⊥ in D (unless D itself is ⊥). So, at
the end of the stage, D satisfies condition 1 of Definition 7.3. None of the subsequent steps make D violate
that condition, so B, too, satisfies that condition. Similarly, a routine examination of the situation reveals
that Stage 2 (resp. 3, . . . , resp. 7) of the Purification procedure makes D satisfy condition 2 (resp. 3, . . . ,
resp. 7) of Definition 7.3, and D continues to satisfy that condition throughout the rest of the stages. So, B
is pure.
Case 4: Immediate from Lemma 7.4. 
Theorem 7.6 A cirquent is valid if (soundness) and only if (completeness) it is provable in CL16.
Proof. The soundness part is immediate from clause 1 of Lemma 6.2 and the fact that the axiom ⊤ is
valid. The rest of this section is devoted to a proof of the completeness part. Pick an arbitrary cirquent A
and assume it is valid. We proceed by induction on the rank of A. Let B be the purification of A.
In view of clauses 2-4 of Lemma 7.5, B is a valid, pure cirquent whose rank does not exceed that of A.
We shall implicitly rely on this fact below. By clause 1 of Lemma 7.5, if B is provable, then so is A. Hence,
in order to show that A is provable, it suffices to show that B is provable. B cannot be ⊥ because then, of
course, it would not be valid. Similarly, B cannot be a literal because obviously no literal is valid. In view
of this observation and B’s being pure, it is clear that the following cases cover all possibilities for B.
Case 1: B is ⊤. Then B is an axiom and hence provable.
Case 2: B is E ⊔c F . Let H be a logical solution of B. Consider the work of H in the scenario where the
environment does not move until H makes the move c.i, where i ∈ {0, 1}. Sooner or later H has to make
such a move, for otherwise B would be lost due to being ⊔c-rooted. Since in the games that we deal with the
order of moves is irrelevant, without loss of generality we may assume that the move c.i is made before any
other moves. Let B′ be the result of replacing in B all subcirquents of the form X0 ⊔c X1 by Xi. Observe
that, after the move c.i is made, in any scenario that may follow, H has to continue and win B′. In other
words, H is a logical solution of (not only B but also) B′. The rank of B′ is of course smaller than that of
B. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, B′ is provable. Then B follows from B′ by Choosing.
Case 3: B is E ⊓c F , and neither E nor F contains the cluster c. By clause 2 of Lemma 6.2, both E and
F are valid, because B follows from them by Splitting. The rank of either cirquent is smaller than that of
B. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, both E and F are provable. Therefore, by Splitting, so is B.
Case 4: B is E1 ∨ . . . ∨ En (n ≥ 2), where each Ei is either a literal of a cirquent of the form F ⊔c G;
besides, for no elementary letter p do we have that both p and ¬p are among E1, . . . , En. Not all of the
cirquents E1, . . . , En can be literals, for otherwise B would be automatically lost under an interpretation
which interprets all those literals as ⊥, contradicting our assumption that B is valid. With this observation
in mind, without loss of generality, we may assume that, for some k with 1 ≤ k ≤ n, the first k cirquents
E1, . . . , Ek are of the form F1 ⊔c1 G1, . . . , Fk ⊔ck Gk and the remaining n − k cirquents Ek+1, . . . , En are
literals. Let H be a logical solution of B. Consider the work of H in the scenario where the environment
makes no moves. Note that, at some point, for some 1 ≤ j ≤ k, H should make the move cj .i (i ∈ {0.1}), for
otherwise B would be lost under an(y) interpretation which interprets all of the literal cirquents Ek+1, . . . , En
as ⊥. Fix such j, i. Let B′ be the result of replacing, in B, every subcirquent of the form X0 ⊔cj X1 by Xi.
With some analysis left to the reader, H can be seen to be a logical solution of B′. Thus, B′ is valid. The
rank of B′ is smaller than that of B and hence, by the induction hypothesis, B′ is provable. But then so is
B, because it follows from B′ by Choosing.
Case 5: B is E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En (n ≥ 2), where, for some e (1 ≤ e ≤ n), Ee — fix it — is not of the form
F ⊓c G or F ∧ G, nor do we have Ee ∈ {⊤,⊥}. The validity of B, of course, implies that Ee, as one of its
∧-conjuncts, is also valid. This rules out the possibility that Ee is a literal, because, as we observed earlier,
a literal cannot be valid. We are therefore left with one of the following two possible subcases:
Subcase 5.1: Ee is of the form F ⊔c G. Let H be a logical solution of B. As in Case 4, consider the work
of H in the scenario where the environment makes no moves. Note that, at some point, H should make the
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move c.0 or c.1, for otherwise B would be lost (under any interpretation). Let us just consider the case of
the above move being c.0 (the case of it being c.1 will be handled in a similar way). Let B0 be the result of
replacing, in B, every subcirquent of the form X ⊔c Y (including the conjunct F ⊔c G) by X . Then, as in
Case 4, H can be seen to be a logical solution of B0. Thus, B0 is valid. The rank of B0 is smaller than that
of B and hence, by the induction hypothesis, B0 is provable. But then so is B, because it follows from B0
by Choosing(a).
Subcase 5.2: Ee is of the form F1 ∨ . . . ∨ Fm, where each Fi (1 ≤ i ≤ m) is either a literal or a cirquent
of the form G ⊔c H , and for no elementary letter p do we have that both p and ¬p are among F1, . . . , Fm.
This case is very similar to Case 4 and, almost literally repeating our reasoning in the latter, we find that B
is provable. 
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